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 The impact that prosopagnosia (face-blindness) has on the human visual system has long 
been hypothesized with regard to the specifics of the impairment. The leading hypothesis in the 
literature, the face-specificity hypothesis, proposes that prosopagnosia is specific only to human 
faces. Other hypotheses have offered alternative explanations for what sorts of identification 
tasks might be affected by damage to the fusiform face area resulting in prosopagnosia, including 
the biological recognition, expert recognition, and subordinate-level recognition hypotheses. An 
additional hypothesis, the coordinate relations hypothesis, offers a compelling explanation for 
the underlying process disrupted by prosopagnosia: that the brain’s ability to detect metric 
changes has been damaged resulting in a deficit to face recognition. This hypothesis was tested 
by looking for deficits in performance in a prosopagnosic when identifying non-faces, because 
such differences would not be explained by the face-specificity hypothesis. Therefore, sheep 
faces were used as a class of stimuli to explore whether prosopagnosia affects identification of 
sheep faces in much the same way that it affects identification of human faces. Results of two 
experiments showed that a prosopagnosic was impaired on identification of sheep faces, 





CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 As we continue to learn about the hardware of the brain that makes cognition possible, 
the non-specificity of brain functions is increasingly revealed. While brain functions can 
certainly be localized to an extent, the brain is not neatly divided into modular sections that 
specialize in one function and one function only. We are now in an age of neuroplasticity and the 
connectome where it is increasingly difficult to label any part of the brain with a specific 
function because of the interconnectedness of processes. Instead, complex networks, varying not 
only between individual humans, but also across the entire lifespan of those humans, are now 
implicated in multiple tasks as opposed to one specific task. A veritable bevy of imaging 
techniques (e.g., fMRI, etc.) have revealed that the cerebellum, once known only for motor 
control, is involved in a wide variety of neurological functions (Schmahmann, 2016), that the 
amygdala, once known only as an emotional center, is important for memory, learning, pain, 
motivation, and other deeply interconnected processes (Amunts et al., 2005; Richardson, 1973), 
and even the very concept of morality, once thought to be housed in some vessel of the soul, is 
not a localized area whatsoever, but arises from multiple processes in distributed locations 
(Greene, 2015). But there are a few regions of the brain that have dedicated advocates insisting 
upon specific assigned functions. Chiefly among these is the fusiform face area (FFA) and its 
neighboring regions implicated in the processing of human faces (e.g., Schalk et al., 2017; 
Kanwisher, 2017, Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997). 
 One reason that some consider the FFA to be specific to human face processing is that the 
brain process responsible for the recognition of faces has been shown to differ from the process 




(object-blindness) show a double dissociation suggesting that the brain uses separate processes 
(or recognition subsystems) to accomplish face and object recognition (Farah, 2004). 
Behavioral evidence for separate recognition systems also exists. Inverting (Yin, 1969) or 
creating photographic negatives (Galper & Hochberg, 1971) disrupt face recognition more than 
object recognition. If part of a face such as a nose is learned in the context of a face, testing 
recognition of the nose in isolation produces a recognition deficit when compared to testing 
recognition in the context of the whole face suggesting encoding of the relationships between 
parts beyond the features of the nose itself (i.e., the part-whole effect, Tanaka & Farah, 1993). 
Identifying half-faces is slower when the tested half-face is aligned with another half-face 
(creating a whole face) than if the halves are misaligned (i.e., the composite effect, Young, 
Hellawell, & Hay, 1987). Visual half-field studies have found that presenting faces to the left 
visual field (and thus to the right hemisphere) as opposed to the right visual field leads to better 
recognition performance, but no hemisphere advantage is typically found for basic-level object 
recognition (Brooks & Cooper, 2006).  
Physiological evidence for this dissociation between face and object recognition comes 
from a variety of methods that have isolated brain responses to faces in the FFA and nearby brain 
regions. The FFA shows maximal activation to faces when compared to non-face objects (e.g., 
flowers, houses, chairs, etc.) in studies using fMRI (McCarthy, Puce, Gore, & Allison, 1997; 
Pinsk et al., 2009), magnetoencephalography (Uono, Sato, Kochiyama, Kubota, Sawada, 
Yoshimura, & Toichi, 2017), single neuron recording (in monkeys: Földiák, Xiao, Keysers, 
Edwards, & Perrett, 2004), and ERP methodologies (Sadeh, Podlipsky, Zhdanov, & Yovel, 
2010). Indeed, intracranial electroencephalography (iEEG) has shown a wide distribution of 




occipitotemporal cortex (Rossion, Jacques, & Jonas, 2018), and electrical stimulation of these 
areas can produce temporary hallucinations of faces superimposed on viewed objects (Schalk et 
al., 2017). It is no wonder, with the physiological evidence pointing firmly in favor of face-
specificity, that the FFA has been considered by some researchers to be an area devoted 
exclusively to face identification. 
We know that these processes for object recognition and face recognition are different. 
However, the issue with which this proposal is concerned is whether the underlying process 
responsible for the successful identification of faces is, in fact, unique to human faces. One 
theory that can explain how these two recognition systems differ is the coordinate relations 
hypothesis, which is not specific to faces. 
The Coordinate Relations Hypothesis 
The coordinate relations hypothesis states that there are two recognition systems that the 
brain can use to accomplish recognition tasks, and the system that the brain uses to complete a 
task is determined by the computational demands of the task in question. The two recognition 
systems used to explain the dissociation between object identification and face identification are 
the categorical system and the coordinate system. These two systems were initially proposed by 
Kosslyn (1987) as lateralized (hemisphere dominant/specialized) systems used for both seeing 
and imagining (i.e., spatial relations theory). According to the coordinate relations hypothesis, if 
a visual recognition task can be accomplished using a representation of an object’s parts and the 
categorical relations of those parts, then the brain will use a basic-level recognition system that 
does not represent exact distances. This first system is the categorical system, which encodes 
visual primitives (e.g., geons, Biederman, 1987) and the relations between those primitives (e.g., 




same parts and relations (see Figure 1), then the face identification system will be used. This 
second system is the coordinate system, which encodes metric data from the visual input, such as 
how far primitives in the representation are from a reference point (Brooks & Cooper, 2006; 
Cooper & Brooks, 2004; Cooper & Wojan, 2000). The basic-level system is more efficient, and 
so is used to satisfice a visual task whenever possible. However, the coordinate-relations 
hypothesis predicts that there is nothing special per se about human faces, but that rather, faces 
are generally subjected to the use of the coordinate system because the task of facial recognition 







Figure 1. Telling a person apart from a sheep is a trivial matter because of categorical 
differences in structure (e.g., face shape, etc.), but telling a person apart from another person or a 
sheep apart from another sheep requires differentiating between the same parts with the same 
relations (e.g., two eyes above a nose above a mouth). Accomplishing this task requires 
additional information, namely the metric distances between the parts (e.g., the amount of space 





Figure 2. The coordinate relations hypothesis posits that metric distances in visual information 
can be encoded. For example, for the left-side woman, the distance from the left eye to the right 
eye is 1.5 grid units. For the right-side woman, the distance from the left eye to the right eye is 1 
grid unit. This difference could be used to differentiate these women. Similarly, the coordinate 
relations hypothesis would predict that metric differences in sheep faces could be encoded and 





Alternatives to the Coordinate Relations Hypothesis 
Previously proposed hypotheses concerning the specificity of the FFA include the 
biological recognition hypothesis (Farah, McMullen, & Meyer, 1991), the expert recognition 
hypothesis (Diamond & Carey, 1986; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997), the subordinate- level recognition 
hypothesis (Gauthier, Anderson, Tarr, Skudlarski, & Gore, 1997; Gauthier, Tarr et al., 2000), and 
the face-specificity hypothesis (Kanwisher et al., 1997; Xu, Liu, & Kanwisher, 2005). Each of 
these hypotheses, and the general pattern of findings supporting each, are discussed in turn. 
The biological recognition hypothesis proposes that it is not faces, per se, that the FFA 
responds to, but rather, biological stimuli in general such as plants and animals as opposed to 
non-living things (Farah, Meyer, & McMullen, 1996). Some evidence for this theory is that 
prosopagnosics, having lesions of the FFA, often have difficulty differentiating between animals 
(Farah et al., 1991; Pallis, 1955), especially four-legged animals (Chao, Martin, & Haxby, 1999). 
Some prosopagnosics also have difficulty differentiating among fruits and vegetables (Barton, 
2008). While there are regions of the brain that seem to react preferentially to biological stimuli, 
such as biological movement (Grossman et al., 2000), and studies have found deficits that seem 
to affect naming of biological stimuli more than naming of non-living stimuli in the form of 
category-specific visual agnosia or anomia (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Farah et al., 1991; 
Wolk, Coslett, & Glosser, 2005), the FFA does not appear to be an area specializing in biological 
stimuli. In terms of specificity, the FFA responds more strongly to faces than to other biological 
stimuli, such as hands (Kanwisher et al., 1997). Also, prosopagnosics can differentiate between 
certain biological stimuli more readily than others as a function of the featural differences 
between them (e.g., differentiating a two-legged animal from a four-legged animal is easier for a 




non-biological stimuli, prosopagnosics can also show deficits in entirely non-living categories 
such as cars (de Haan & Campbell, 1991), buildings, and money (O’Brien, 2018), and other 
visually ambiguous stimuli (Damasio, Damasio, & Van Hoesen, 1982), demonstrating that 
damage to the FFA does not specifically target the recognition of biological stimuli. Therefore, a 
hypothesis restricting the FFA’s role to recognition of biological stimuli is not sufficient to 
explain the findings in the literature. The coordinate relations hypothesis can explain the finding 
that prosopagnosics have difficulty distinguishing between living things (people, four-legged 
animals, fruits) as a consequence of the fact that many living things share the same parts and 
relations (e.g., people generally have two eyes, a nose, and a mouth in a specific configuration; 
four legged animals have four legs attached to the same points on the body; an apple and a 
tomato may both be represented as a stem above a spherical body) and therefore rely on the 
damaged (in prosopagnosia) coordinate-based recognition system for effective differentiation. 
The expert recognition hypothesis (also called the expertise hypothesis, e.g., Xu et al,. 
2005) says that the FFA is responsible for recognition of classes of objects that people are 
experts at identifying, and that faces are a class of objects that most humans are experts at 
recognizing (Gauthier, 2017; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997). Evidence for the expert recognition 
hypothesis comes from two groups of studies. The first involves testing experts in categories of 
stimuli (such as dog experts, car experts, or bird experts) using paradigms that elicit processing 
deficits for faces, typically inversion effects, in order to determine if a similar deficit will show 
up for non-face classes of stimuli (e.g., Diamond & Carey, 1986; McGugin, Newton, Gore, & 
Gauthier, 2014). The second group of studies involve expertise training for a class of objects, 
often an artificial class (e.g., using nonsense objects made of geons that can be easily 




similar objects within that class (e.g., “greeble” studies, Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Tarr & Gauthier, 
2000). Both of these groups of studies have found activation in the FFA, to some degree, in the 
absence of faces. 
The subordinate-level recognition hypothesis proposes that the recognition system 
responsible for distinguishing individual facial identities is not used for recognizing faces, per se, 
but that facial identity happens to be one category of stimuli requiring an extra level of 
processing, referred to as subordinate-level processing, beyond basic-level processing used for 
most object recognition tasks (Gauthier et al., 1997). According to this account, subordinate-
level recognition occurs in the FFA region impacted by prosopagnosia. In other words, while the 
basic-level system was said to be responsible for distinguishing amongst members of disparate 
classes (a chair among tables, for example), the subordinate-level system was hypothesized to be 
responsible for distinguishing within classes of items sharing a category (a rocking chair 
amongst reclining chairs, for example) (Gauthier, Tarr et al., 2000). In this way, the tasks of 
detecting a face (a basic-level system task) and identifying a face (a subordinate- level task) could 
be differentiated from each other, potentially explaining why prosopagnosia seems to impact 
tasks wherein the differentiation is between minute differences (e.g., between cars of the same 
model from different years, Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, & Anderson, 2000; etc.). In support of 
this proposal, research has shown that face detection and face identification are indeed 
dissociable (Robertson, Jenkins, & Burton, 2017). 
These two hypotheses of expertise and subordinate-level recognition are somewhat 
compatible with one another, and Tarr and Gauthier (2000) made the case that the face 
recognition area of the brain (the FFA) was actually a flexible subordinate- level visual 




classes of stimuli. In other words, their merged hypothesis was that the development of expertise 
in recognizing a class of objects (e.g., differentiating between families of greebles, or between 
bird species, or any class of objects) was reflected in the brain’s FFA by training the subordinate-
level visual processing system to differentiate amongst the minute differences between objects 
sharing a class. This process, in turn, was said to also explain face-processing, simply as one 
class of expert objects that the average person had expertise in due to training over their lives 
(i.e., extensive exposure to faces and need to differentiate them, leading to expertise). 
Certain aspects of the expertise and subordinate- level hypotheses are supported by the 
empirical data. Some fMRI studies have shown that manipulating levels of expertise produce 
more successful subordinate-level categorizations with corresponding increases in the response 
of the FFA (Tarr & Gauthier, 2000; Xu, 2005). Level of expertise in cars has been shown to have 
a significant predictive relationship with the strength of brain response in the FFA (McGugin et 
al., 2014). Greeble studies have shown that training on a novel class of stimuli created sensitivity 
to inversion effects and small deviations in their configurations, similar to faces (Gauthier & 
Tarr, 1997).  
However, evidence against the expertise and subordinate- level hypotheses is also 
extensive. Some neuroimaging studies have failed to find that brain activity in the FFA, in 
response to a class of objects, increases as a function of level of expertise with that class of 
objects (Grill-Spector, Knouf, & Kanwisher, 2004), and inversion effects do not always correlate 
with expertise (Rezlescu, Chapman, Susilo, Caramazza, 2016; Weiss, Mardo, & Avidan, 2016). 
Greeble studies have been criticized because the greeble stimuli resemble faces, which could be 
why they recruit activity in the FFA (Kanwisher & Yovel, 2006; but see Gauthier, Behrmann, & 




with an impaired FFA (Duchaine, Dingle, Nakayama, & Butterworth, 2004). Deficits resulting 
from prosopagnosia, too, seem to exist regardless of expertise levels and subordinate classes. For 
example, deficits have been shown to exist for prosopagnosics when expertise and class remain 
constant, via metric manipulations of within-class objects such as furniture (e.g., changing the 
length of a table) that create a deficit while structural changes (e.g., changing the shape of the 
table) do not produce this deficit (Casner, 2006). Additionally, prosopagnosics have shown 
deficits in basic level naming tasks of animals, such as between species of four-legged animals 
(Chao et al., 1999), and in situations where the subordinate- level recognition hypothesis does not 
predict differences, because the animal discrimination is at the basic level (e.g., fox vs. dog, 
Casner, 2006). Therefore, while the FFA and closely related regions of the brain appear to use 
expertise during identification, and subordinate- level familiarity is necessary for effective 
identification (e.g., semantic naming tasks benefit from it), they do not appear sufficient to 
explain prosopagnosia-related deficits to face identification. 
The coordinate relations hypothesis and subordinate- level recognition hypothesis both 
predict that the face recognition regions will be used to make subordinate level distinctions 
among objects sharing the same parts and relations. In general, both predict the empirical finding 
that subordinate-level recognition tasks (e.g., tasks that require the use of metric differences) 
show more activation in the FFA than do basic-level recognition tasks (e.g., Gauthier et al., 
1997). However, the coordinate relations hypothesis differs in its prediction when the 
subordinate-level recognition task can be satisficed by non-metric features (i.e., categorical 
features). For example, the coordinate relations hypothesis predicts that subordinate-level 




instead be performed by the basic level object (i.e. categorical) recognition system, which 
satisfices the recognition task with less computational demand. 
The coordinate relations hypothesis agrees with the expertise recognition hypothesis that 
prosopagnosics’ deficits are not specific to human faces (i.e., differentiation of non-faces can be 
affected). However, the coordinate relations hypothesis does not predict that expertise is a 
necessary or sufficient condition for a prosopagnosic deficit to occur. While expertise does 
physically modify the brain (e.g., by increasing the complexity of neurons responding to a task as 
expertise in that task increases, McGugin et al., 2014), and could therefore change how the brain 
responds when identifying a stimulus (e.g., by increasing reliance on neurons localized in the 
FFA), the coordinate relations hypothesis predicts that a deficit to identification can occur in the 
absence of expertise. Importantly, the differences used for differentiation in expert recognition 
tasks commonly used in expertise studies (e.g., greebles, dogs, birds, cars) can frequently be 
distinguished by coordinate, but not categorical, relations, allowing the coordinate relations 
hypothesis to potentially explain the involvement of the FFA (Brooks & Cooper, 2006). 
The face-specificity hypothesis has a very straightforward account of the FFA’s function. 
Essentially, the face-specificity hypothesis posits that the FFA contains a mechanism for 
detecting the specific ‘holistic’ geometry of faces, and that this mechanism exclusively functions 
for human faces (Kanwisher & Yovel, 2006). Additionally, what exactly is meant by the word 
‘holistic’ (as well as the word configural) is controversial, in that the operational definition varies 
greatly between studies (Esins, Schultz, Stemper, Kennerknecht, & Bülthoff, 2016; O’Toole, 
Abdi, Deffenbacher, & Valentin, 1995). Because the word holistic means different things to 
different researchers, and has been used to refer to both theoretical constructs as well as 




different about the face that can be put to an empirical test (see Richler, Palmeri, & Gauthier, 
2012, for a discussion of the “loosely defined” definition of holistic processing). For that reason, 
the word holistic has been specifically avoided in the preparation of these experiments, in favor 
of testable operational definitions (e.g., categories of up, down; metric distance) without 
terminology baggage. 
There is much evidence against the face-specificity account. The FFA contains cells that 
are not face selective (Weiner & Grill-Spector, 2010). Prosopagnosics show recognition deficits 
in many areas that are not related to faces, such as birds (Bornstein, 1963), cows (Bornstein, 
Sroka & Munitz, 1969) cars (Damasio et al., 1982), foods when grocery shopping (Damasio et 
al., 1982), chairs (Faust, 1955), and buildings (Pallis, 1955). Inversion effects can show up when 
using categories of stimuli that are not human faces, such as dogs (Diamond & Carey, 1986) and 
cars (Rezlescu et al., 2016). Prosopagnosics make more errors than neurotypical people in 
detecting differences when parts of non-face objects change position or orientation (e.g., metric 
changes such as an oblique angle of one geon relative to another geon becoming larger such that 
it is still an oblique angle) but do not make more errors when the changes are categorical (e.g., an 
oblique angle of one geon relative to another geon becoming perpendicular, Casner, 2006). The 
face specificity hypothesis cannot account for these findings. Furthermore, there is no definitive 
reason that a region of the brain typically used to process faces cannot also sometimes be called 
upon for the processing of other stimuli (Bruce & Humphreys, 1994). In other words, 
experimentally showing that faces are processed in the FFA does not, and cannot, “prove” that 
other categories of objects are not processed there.  
Whenever a claim is made that a prosopagnosic has a deficit specific to human faces and 




category of objects that they were not tested upon (Barton & Corrow, 2016). Interestingly, a 
meta-analysis including 72 people with face recognition deficits that were also tested in their 
recognition of at least three other object categories revealed that zero of the people showed a 
pure face recognition deficit without also having some other object recognition deficit (Geskin & 
Behrmann, 2018). In theory, a single “pure” face recognition deficit due to FFA damage would 
confirm the face specificity hypothesis, but this cannot be accomplished due to the impossibility 
of testing people with face recognition deficits on all possible recognition tasks. Therefore, the 
face specificity hypothesis necessarily has weak credibility in its status as a theory.  
Importantly, studies that implicate face-specific mechanisms in prosopagnosia have not 
tested the coordinate relations hypothesis’ prediction of impairment in the differentiation of 
images with metric differences, even though they claim to have ruled out alternative hypotheses 
(e.g., Duchaine, Yovel, Butterworth, & Nakayama, 2006; Kanwisher, 2000; Kanwisher & Yovel, 
2006). 
The coordinate relations hypothesis is not compatible with the face-specificity 
hypothesis. According to the coordinate relations hypothesis, there is nothing special about faces 
specifically that would lead to the use of the proposed coordinate system, but instead, any 
differentiation task requiring attention to metric differences that cannot be satisficed via a less 
computationally expensive difference (e.g., color, shape) will use the coordinate system. 
In order to test these hypotheses and determine what the specific (or not-so-specific) 
function of the FFA is, it is informative to use experiments with prosopagnosic participants. 
Prosopagnosic Experiments 
There are two main groups of prosopagnosics: acquired (i.e., from brain damage) and 




the FFA. Acquired prosopagnosics show lesions in these brain regions implicated in face 
recognition especially including the FFA of the right hemisphere (Barton, 2008) while congenital 
prosopagnosics show reduced gray matter in the FFA and related brain regions (Garrido et al., 
2009) and impaired (undifferentiated) neural response patterns to intact and scrambled faces 
(Avidan & Behrmann, 2009; Zhang, Liu, & Xu, 2015). 
In prosopagnosics, there is a dissociation between face identification and face detection. 
In other words, prosopagnosics can detect faces even when they cannot identify the faces (e.g., 
Garrido, Duchaine, & Nakayama, 2008). This dissociation between identification and detection 
is supported via physiological and neuropsychological evidence. Physiological evidence includes 
that transmagnetic stimulation of the OFA disrupts recognition (identification) of faces, but not 
categorization (detection) of faces (Solomon-Harris, Mullin, & Steeves, 2013). Experimentally, 
it has been shown that the ability to detect and the ability to identify faces are not significantly 
related (Robertson, Jenkins, & Burton, 2017). Neuropsychological evidence comes from the fact 
that while prosopagnosics struggle to identify faces, they can detect faces and facial expressions, 
as well as individual facial features such as eyes and eye color (Richoz, Jack, Garrod, Schyns, & 
Caldara, 2015; Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1988). 
One of the main challenges to the coordinate relations hypothesis is McNeil & 
Warrington’s (1993) finding that a prosopagnosic was able to distinguish sheep. In this study, a 
prosopagnosic, known as WJ, was tested for his ability to recognize faces of people and faces of 
sheep. Upon comparing his results to a control sample (including some age-controlled and 
profession-controlled participants) he was found to have a deficit in recognizing human faces, 
but not sheep faces. Specifically, WJ was asked to complete a number of sheep identification 




sheep (J. E. McNeil, personal communication, February 5, 2019). In one experiment, WJ saw a 
sequential presentation of 8 sheep photos, and then later saw a presentation of 16 sheep photos 
and had to indicate whether each photo had been in the previous list. This task was repeated a 
total of three times: using sheep from WJ’s own flock, using sheep unfamiliar to WJ, and using 
human faces unfamiliar to WJ. WJ performed better with both sheep tasks than with the human 
face task, while control subjects performed better with human faces and much worse with the 
sheep faces (both compared to human face performance and compared to WJ’s sheep 
performance). In a second experiment, WJ memorized names associated with sheep faces and 
then was asked to recall those names when shown the faces later. This process was repeated with 
human faces, as well. The results showed that control subjects outperformed him at the human 
face task but scored similarly on the sheep task. The study concluded that prosopagnosia is a 
disorder specific to human faces. 
 However, this study by McNeil & Warrington (1993), despite being called ingenious in 
the prosopagnosia literature (Farah, 2004) and being cited over one hundred and fifty times at the 
time of this writing, has several glaring flaws that could be remedied by an improved design. 
First, the individual sheep used in the experiment were not represented by multiple pictures, but 
were instead represented by a single exemplar photograph, and the photographs were not 
standardized in terms of aspect ratio or background detail (i.e., features of the photo that were 
not the sheep in question varied from photo to photo). This procedure is problematic because a 
participant (prosopagnosic or not) could memorize certain non-face features of the photo in order 
to improve their accuracy during the trials. Secondly, the prosopagnosic tested in this experiment 
provided some of the sheep photos that were used for the study. This problem compounds with 




Thirdly, the sheep photos used had noticeable identifiable features, such as spots, that would 
allow the possibility of recognition via systems other than the traditional face recognition system. 
That is, people could memorize a single spot on the image, and use that spot to ascertain the 
identity of the same individual later. Fourthly, given that only one picture was used for each 
sheep, the orientation or pose of the sheep could be used to identify specific individuals. 
Therefore, while the research question of McNeil and Warrington was intriguing, the way in 
which they designed the experiment to answer the question was problematic. 
The Present Experiments 
The current research attempts to replicate McNeil & Warrington (1993), but with 
superior materials including multiple photos with various viewpoints of each individual sheep to 
be used in the experiment and control of exposure to those materials. This procedure can 
determine whether prosopagnosia interferes with recognition of sheep faces in the absence of 
other surface cues (e.g., spots). 
 A second improvement is to use a paradigm more traditionally suited to studies 
concerning face identification. In the McNeil and Warrington (1993) paper, participants reported 
whether they recognized a face from a recently displayed group of faces, or matched learned 
names with previously seen faces. While it is certainly true that ecologically valid face 
identification can take place as a comparison between a stored representation and new input from 
the environment, this design depends on successful memory as well. Research has shown that 
face memory (sequential presentation) and face perception (simultaneous presentation) tasks 
correlate highly (r = .61 in Bowles et al., 2009), and both can be useful for the assessment of face 
recognition impairments, but it may be argued that remembering details of a sheep face is 




attend to. In order to eliminate the extra task of memorizing and recalling, instead of presenting 
photos sequentially as in the McNeil and Warrington paper, it is more appropriate to use 
simultaneous presentation of two side-by-side photographs as are used in both forensic casework 
(e.g., legal contexts) and laboratory studies of human face recognition (White, Norell, Phillips & 
O’Toole, 2017). It has been recommended that experiments designed specifically for 
prosopagnosics should use identification tasks featuring multiple simultaneously presented 
images showing different viewpoints of the subject (Watson, Huis in ‘t Veld, & de Gelder, 
2016), eliminating both general memory problems (e.g., sheep being harder to remember, 
inaccurate memory retrieval, etc.) and a memorization problem (i.e., participants will not be able 
to memorize features of the photograph itself due to different viewpoints of the individuals being 
used). Doing so will allow a direct test of whether identity can be ascertained from a set of two 
images of the same (or different) individual(s), and whether the mechanism of doing so differs 
depending on whether the image is of a human face or of a sheep face. 
 A human face identification task and a sheep face identification task were used to test 
whether the original findings from the McNeil & Warrington (1993) paper replicate when 
surface cues on the sheep cannot be used to perform the task. The human face experiment 
occurred first, in order to determine if the paradigm used (simultaneous presentation for a 
same/different identification task) produced the expected deficit in human face identification for 
the prosopagnosic participant. 
 In order to test whether the inclusion of spots assists a prosopagnosic in determining the 
identify of sheep, the sheep experiment included comparisons between sheep with spots and 
sheep without spots. The spotted (speckled-faced) sheep and the non-spotted (white-faced) sheep 




speckled comparisons all took place. In order to make the human face identification task 
resemble the sheep identification task, similar comparisons took place between human faces that 
were clean shaven, and human faces with mustaches (as analogous to spots on sheep). That is, 
mustachioed-shaven, shaven-shaven, and mustachioed-mustachioed comparisons all took place. 
In regards to the sheep task, according to the coordinate relations hypothesis, the 
prosopagnosic should show deficits on both the face and sheep identification tasks. If the ability 
of McNeil & Warrington’s (1993) prosopagnosic participant to identify sheep was based off of 
surface features (e.g., spots) then the prosopagnosic should not be able to differentiate sheep 
when all surface features diagnostic of identity are taken away. 
 Additionally, a comparison will be made between identification using sheep faces and 
identification using sheep bodies. The coordinate relations hypothesis predicts that identification 
using sheep bodies should present as much difficulty to the prosopagnosic as the sheep face task 
does (when compared to the control group). It is unclear whether the face-specificity hypothesis 
would predict a difference between performance on sheep body and sheep face differentiation 
tasks, although Kanwisher and Yovel (2006) have argued that the more (human) face-like the 
stimuli, the more likely the FFA is to be involved in the process, so perhaps the argument would 
be that sheep face identification will be harder for the prosopagnosic than sheep body 




CHAPTER 2.  EXPERIMENT 1  
Method 
Participants 
 For this experiment, the participants consisted of a single acquired prosopagnosic (LB), a 
control group of 34 participants consisting of undergraduates in the Iowa State University subject 
pool, and an age-and-gender matched control, as is common practice in prosopagnosia 
experiments in order to rule out age-effects such as diminishing visual acuity (e.g., Busigny, 
Graf, Mayer, Rossion, 2010). Compensation was provided for the prosopagnosic and age-
matched control in the form of a payment of $40/hr. of experiments. Undergraduates (28 female, 
6 male) were compensated with course credit. 
Test of prosopagnosia. The prosopagnosic in this study was given the Cambridge Face 
Memory Test (CFMT; Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006) in order to verify their face blindness. This 
test produces scores with high internal reliability (Cronbach’s alpha =.89 in Bowles et al., 2009). 
A score below 60% indicates face-blindness, while the average neurotypical adult scores 80% 
(Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006). LB scored 51% and the age-matched control scored 94%. The 
age-matched control’s result is within the normative range of neurotypical results that ranges 
from 60% to 100% accuracy (see Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006). 
Nature of the acquired prosopagnosia. LB was diagnosed with prosopagnosia 
following a posterior cerebral artery stroke when she was 39 years of age. The stroke damaged 
her hippocampus unilaterally and her inferior temporal cortex bilaterally. The bilateral damage to 
her inferior temporal cortex is assumed to be the primary cause of the prosopagnosia, as she did 
not report such problems existing before the occurrence of the stroke. Comorbid with the 




naming difficulties), topographical disorientation (navigation difficulties), right upper 
quadrantanopia (blindness in the upper right quadrant of vision), and left homonymous 
hemianopia (blindness in the left half of vision), all of which were diagnosed after her stroke. LB 
has normal visual acuity in her remaining quarter-field of vision. In previous interviews, LB has 
complained about difficulties not only with face recognition, but also about difficulties with 
distinguishing very similar-looking classes of stimuli sharing metric features (e.g., buildings, 
animals, plants, food, fake and real money). LB is not atypical in her deficits when 
differentiating objects, nor is she an unusual case regarding comorbid visual issues, all of which 
(i.e., visual field defects, achromatopsia, and topographagnosia) are clinically common in case 
studies with fusiform lesions (Barton, 2011). Despite low-level vision being in various states of 
partial impairment in acquired prosopagnosia cases, low-level defects cannot, on their own, 
explain the face identification deficits—the sensory impairments insufficiently explain 
recognition and identification deficits (De Haan, Heywood, Young, Edelstyn, & Newcombe, 
1995). Thus, LB is a typical prosopagnosic participant. 
Age-matched and gender-matched control. A matched control participant for LB of 
appropriate age and gender was selected for these experiments. The age-matched control had no 
history of brain damage. LB and the age-matched control were within a year of age at the time of 
the experiments (i.e., both were 53 years old). LB is a retired junior-high math teacher and the 
age-matched control works administratively at a university and has completed a 4-year college 
degree. Neither LB nor the age-matched control had previously been a caretaker for sheep. 
Materials 
The experiment took place on a 14-inch (2560 x 1440 pixels) laptop display using a Dell 




adjusted screen resolution of 1600 x 1200 pixels, scaled to fit the full screen. Assuming that 
participants sat at a comfortable 22-inch viewing distance from the screen, the visual angle of 
each photo stimulus was 11.6° horizontal by 6.8° vertical. 
The stimuli for this experiment consisted of photos of state-level elected legislators from 
the United States. Notably, photos were chosen only of Caucasian males with short hair to 
minimize differences between individuals. This category of photos was selected due to the large 
number of official photos available of each individual, which allowed for selection of high-
quality photos taken from different viewing angles. Photos were cropped to create matched 
aspect ratios (4:3) in order to take up the same amount of space during simultaneous 
presentation, and were cropped such that each image contained mainly the head of each 
individual (See Figure 3). The photos were converted to grayscale to remove color information. 
In order to create conditions analogous to the speckled vs. non-speckled sheep condition, half of 
the face photos contained an individual possessing a mustache, while half contained an 
individual that was clean-shaven. With two face shots each of eight mustachioed and eight clean-










Design and Procedure 
 Informed consent was given before the experiment began. Participants were seated at a 
comfortable distance from the computer. Participants used the keyboard to progress through the 
experimental instructions displayed on the screen at their own pace. Each trial in the experiment 
consisted of a 1.2 s fixation display in the center of the screen, followed immediately by the 
simultaneous display of two photos side-by-side on the monitor that remained on the screen until 
the participant responded. Progressing through each trial was self-paced, with a response of ‘S’ 
on the keyboard if the participant believed the displayed photos were of the same individual, and 
the ‘N’ key if the participant believed the photos were not of the same individual. These S/N 
response options were displayed on-screen below the stimuli during the trials. If the participant 
was correct in their keypress, the word “Correct” appeared in a blue font on-screen for three 
seconds. If they were incorrect, the word “Incorrect” appeared in a red font instead. 
 Eight practice trials occurred to familiarize participants with the procedure before 64 test 
trials. The practice trials did not use any of the same photos as used in the test trials. The 64 test 
trials consisted of 32 comparisons between the same individuals (with the two photos of each 
individual appearing in both possible permutations), 16 comparisons between different 
individuals within the same feature group (shaven-shaven and mustache-mustache comparisons), 
and 16 comparisons between feature groups (shaven-mustache comparisons). In this way, each 
photo appeared a total of four times, twice in the left position, and twice in the right position. 
Results 
LB’s performance, as measured by percentage of trials accurately responded to during the 
human face differentiation tasks, was analyzed using modified t-tests. LB’s scores were 




Crawford & Howell (1998) as an appropriate test for tests in which the normative sample 
includes less than 50 participants. The modified formula is as follows: 
 
Within this formula, X1 is the individual of interest’s score, X̅2 is the mean of the control 
group, S2 is the standard deviation of the control group, and N2 is the control group sample size. 
LB’s overall performance on Experiment 1 was 76.6% correct across 64 trials. This was 
significantly lower than the performance of the control group (M = 94.5%, SE = .77, t(33) = 3.91, 
p < .001). The overall results of Experiment 1 are shown in Figure 4. Proportions of accurate 
responses by trial type and correct response are shown in Table 1. 
Three additional performance tests were conducted on the Experiment 1 data, 
corresponding to the mustachioed-shaven, shaven-shaven, and mustachioed-mustachioed groups 
of trials. The test value for these three t-tests was LB’s performance level, which was compared 
to the average performance levels of the 34 control subjects across trials of the specified type. 





Figure 4. Experiment 1 overall results. LB’s performance on face identification for legislators 
was significantly lower than control performance. The age-matched control performance was not 
significantly different from control performance. Chance level responding is 50%. The error bar 






Figure 5. Experiment 1 results by trial type. LB’s performance on all trial types was significantly 
lower than control performance. The age-matched control performance was not significantly 
different from control performance. Chance level responding is 50%. The error bars for the 






Accuracy in Experiment 1 by Trial Type and Correct Response 
 LB Controls Age-Matched Control 
 Correct Response Correct Response Correct Response 
Trial Type Same Different Same Different Same Different 
Shaven .75 .88 .94 .97 1 1 
Mustachioed-Shaven  .81  .98  1 
Mustachioed .81 .50 .97 .81 1 1 
Note: For the control group, the number given is expressed as the mean percent correct. Trial 






LB’s performance on the shaven-shaven trials was 79.2% and was significantly lower 
than the performance of the control group (M = 94.9%, SE = 1.06, t(33)=2.51, p = .017). LB’s 
performance on mustachioed-shaven trials was 81.3%, which was significantly lower than the 
performance of the control group (M = 98.4%, SE = .55, t(33)=5.28, p < .001). LB’s performance 
on the mustachioed-mustachioed trials was 70.8%, which was significantly lower than the 
performance of the control group (M = 91.5%, SE = 1.30, t(33)=2.67, p = .012). 
 In order to determine if there was a difference in LB’s accuracy between trial types (i.e., 
if her accuracy on one trial type was significantly worse relative to her accuracy on another trial 
type, all relative to the control group), a difference analysis was conducted. LB’s differences in 
performance between the three trial types were calculated by subtracting her average 
performance for one trial type from another trial type in all three possible permutations (e.g., her 
shaven-shaven performance subtracted from her mustachioed-mustachioed performance, etc.). 
These difference scores were then compared to the control group’s difference scores, calculated 
in the same way, using three t-tests. For shaven-shaven trials compared to mustachioed-shaven 
trials, LB’s difference score of -2.1% was not significantly different from the difference scores of 
the control group (M = -3.5%, SE = 1.15, t(33)=.207, p = .838). For mustachioed-shaven trials 
compared to mustachioed-mustachioed trials, LB’s difference score of 10.4% was not 
significantly different from the difference scores of the control group (M = 6.8%, SE = 1.37, 
t(33)=.444, p = .660). For shaven-shaven trials compared to mustachioed-mustachioed trials, 
LB’s difference score of 8.3% was not significantly different from the difference scores of the 
control group (M = 3.3%, SE = 1.29, t(33)=.658, p = .515). 
 An additional set of analyses (one overall performance test, three tests of trial-specific 




scores with the age-and-gender-matched control participant’s scores. The overall performance of 
the age-matched control on Experiment 1 was 100%, which was not significantly different from 
the performance of the control group (M = 94.5%, SE = .77, t(33)=1.20, p = .238).  
The age-matched control’s performance on the shaven-shaven trials was 100% and was 
not significantly different from the performance of the control group (M = 94.9%, SE = 1.06, 
t(33)=.824, p = .416). The age-matched control’s performance on mustachioed-shaven trials was 
100%, which was not significantly different from the performance of the control group (M = 
98.4%, SE = .55, t(33)=.511, p = .613). The age-matched control’s performance on the 
mustachioed-mustachioed trials was 100%, which was not significantly different from the 
performance of the control group (M = 91.5%, SE = 1.30, t(33)=1.09, p = .283).  
For shaven-shaven trials compared to mustachioed-shaven trials, the age-matched 
control’s difference score of 0% was not significantly different from the difference scores of the 
control group (M = -3.5%, SE = 1.15, t(33)=.512, p = .612). For mustachioed-shaven trials 
compared to mustachioed-mustachioed trials, the age-matched control’s difference score of 0% 
was not significantly different from the difference scores of the control group (M = 6.8%, SE = 
1.37, t(33)=.836, p = .409). For shaven-shaven trials compared to mustachioed-mustachioed 
trials, the age-matched control’s difference score of 0% was not significantly different from the 
difference scores of the control group (M = 3.3%, SE = 1.29, t(33)=.434, p = .667). 
Discussion 
 In Experiment 1, LB demonstrated that her deficit in identification of human faces was 
impaired at all trial levels. Regardless of whether the comparison was between two clean-shaven 
men, one mustachioed and one clean-shaven man, or between two mustachioed men, LB 




group. The results of Experiment 1 confirm that LB shows deficits in the identification task used 
for the present study, at least for human faces. 
Because none of LB’s difference scores were significantly different from the difference 
scores for the control group, there was no obvious interaction between her impairment at the 
level of compared trial types (e.g., shaven-shaven vs. mustachioed-mustachioed) relative to the 
controls, despite LB exhibiting an overall impairment for all faces used. 
Because none of the tests comparing the age-matched control to the student control group 
were statistically significant, it is unlikely that age played a significant role in the significant 






CHAPTER 3.  EXPERIMENT 2 
Method 
Participants 
 The participants in this study were identical to the first experiment; all participants 
completed both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. The prosopagnosic was LB again, the control 
group consisted of the same 34 undergraduates from the participant pool at Iowa State University 
that were used in Experiment 1, and the same age-matched control for LB was used. 
Materials 
The experimental setup was identical to Experiment 1 concerning equipment used, with 
the exception of the photographs used. The stimuli for Experiment 2 consisted of photos of sheep 
taken by the author. These photos are adapted from still frames taken from video recordings of 
sheep at the Iowa State University Lab Farm. Sixteen individual sheep were recorded for the 
creation of these materials. 
Specifically, of the sheep used, eight sheep were white-faced polypay sheep, while eight 
sheep were speckled-faced polypay sheep. Four photos of each sheep, consisting of two head-
only photos and two full-body photos, were created using cropped still frames from the video 
recordings, each cropped to a matching aspect ratio (4:3). The photos featured natural variations 
in posing, lighting, and camera focus (see Figure 6 and Figure 7). The sheep were not restrained 
during the filming, and were captured at natural angles as they roamed around the pen with the 
photographer using a handheld video camera to track their movement. Because all sheep was 
photographed in the same pen, the backgrounds in the photos were not diagnostic of sheep 
identity. All images used were converted to grayscale to eliminate color cues (e.g., the pink of 















Design and Procedure 
 The design and procedure for Experiment 2 greatly resembled those from Experiment 1, 
but with a different number of trials and different photographs. Because the wish is to examine a 
potentially face-specific deficit in the prosopagnosic participant, a sheep-face and sheep-body set 
of materials were both used.  A total of four photos of each sheep were used, two of the face and 
two of the whole body including the head. The number of sheep photos was thus double the 
number of legislator photos, where only two face photos were used for each legislator. 
Ten practice trials, including both body and face comparisons, occurred to familiarize 
participants with the procedure before 128 test trials. The practice trials did not use any of the 
same photos found in the following test trials. The 128 test trials consisted of 64 comparisons 
between the same individuals (with the two photos of each individual appearing in both possible 
permutations), 32 comparisons between different individuals within the same feature group 
(white-white and speckled-speckled comparisons), and 32 comparisons between feature groups 
(white-speckled comparisons). Half of each of these trials were face-face comparisons, and half 
of these trials were body-body comparisons. In this way, each sheep photo appeared a total of 
four times, twice in the left position, and twice in the right position. 
Results 
LB’s overall performance on Experiment 2 was 69.5% correct across all 128 trials. This 
was significantly lower than the performance of the control group (M = 79.9%, SE = .68, t(33) = 
2.56, p = .015). The overall performance from Experiment 2 is shown in Figure 8. Proportions of 
accurate responses by trial type and correct response are shown in Table 2. 
First, LB’s performance on the white-white, speckled-speckled, and speckled-white sheep 




LB’s performance on the white-white trials was 60.4% and was not significantly different from 
the performance of the control group (M = 68.9%, SE = 1.10, t(33)=1.32, p = .197). LB’s 
performance on speckled-white trials was 96.9%, which was not significantly different than the 
performance of the control group (M = 99.4%, SE = .31, t(33)=1.32, p = .195). LB’s performance 
on the speckled-speckled trials was 60.4%, which was significantly lower than the performance 
of the control group (M = 77.9%, SE = 1.01, t(33)=2.93, p = .006). 
Next, LB’s performance on the face trials and body trials were examined in comparison 
to the controls (see Figure 10). LB’s performance on the face trials was 71.8%, which was 
significantly lower than the performance of the control group (M = 83.3%, SE = .87, t(33)=2.21, 
p = .034). Additionally, LB’s performance of 67.2% on the body trials was significantly lower 







Figure 8. Overall results from Experiment 2. LB’s performance on sheep identification for was 
significantly lower than control performance. The age-matched control performance was not 
significantly different from control performance. Chance level responding is 50%. The error bar 





Figure 9. Experiment 2 results by trial type. LB’s performance on Speckled trials was 
significantly lower than control performance. The age-matched control performance was not 
significantly different from control performance. Chance level responding is 50%. The error bars 





Figure 10. The results of Experiment 2 partitioned by body part used to make the identity 
judgment (face or whole body). LB’s performance on Face and Body trials was significantly 
lower than control performance on those respective trial types. The age-matched control 
performance was not significantly different from control performance. Chance level responding 






Accuracy in Experiment 2 by Trial Type and Correct Response 
 LB Controls Age-Matched Control 
 Correct Response Correct Response Correct Response 
Trial Type Same Different Same Different Same Different 
White .66 .50 .87 .32 .88 .25 
Speckled-White  .97  .99  1 
Speckled .59 .63 .87 .60 .75 .75 
Face .59 .84 .88 .79 .88 .81 
Body .66 .69 .86 .67 .75 .69 
Note: For the control group, the number given is expressed as the mean percent correct. Trial 
types where speckled-white comparisons were made had no trials where “Same” was the correct 
response. White, speckled-white, and speckled trials are collapsed across face and body trials. 




Following this, the three trial type accuracy scores were subdivided into face trials and 
body trials, creating six accuracy scores (e.g., face-only white-white, body-only speckled-white, 
etc.). LB’s performance on the white-white face trials was 62.5% which was not significantly 
different from the control group (M = 72.8%, SE = 1.41, t(33)=1.23, p = .226). LB’s performance 
on the white-white body trials was 58.3% which was not significantly different from the control 
group (M = 65.1%, SE = 1.41, t(33)=.809, p = .424). LB’s performance on the speckled-white 
face trials was 100%, which was not significantly different from the performance of the control 
group (M = 99.8%, SE = .18, t(33)=.169, p = .867). LB’s performance on the speckled-white 
body trials was 93.8%, which was not significantly different from the performance of the control 
group (M = 98.9%, SE = .62, t(33)=1.41, p = .168). LB’s performance on the speckled-speckled 
face trials was 62.5%, which was significantly lower than the performance of the control group 
(M = 82.7%, SE = 1.39, t(33)=2.47, p = .019). LB’s performance on the speckled-speckled body 
trials was 58.3%, which was significantly lower than the performance of the control group (M = 
73.0%, SE = 1.07, t(33)=2.32,  p= .027). 
 In order to determine if there was a difference in LB’s accuracy between trial types (i.e., 
if her accuracy on one trial type was significantly worse relative to her accuracy on another trial 
type, all relative to the control group), a difference analysis was conducted. Difference scores 
were calculated between the three trial type scores in all three possible permutations. These 
difference score steps were repeated for the face and body trials as well, subtracting body 
performance from face performance. For white-white trials compared to speckled-white trials, 
LB’s difference score of -36.5% was not significantly different from the difference scores of the 
control group (M = -30.4, SE = 1.10, t(33)=.924, p = .362). LB’s difference score of 36.5% 




the control group’s difference scores (M = 21.5%, SE = 1.07, t(33)=2.37, p = .024). For 
speckled-white trials compared to speckled-speckled trials, LB’s difference score of 0% was not 
significantly different from the difference scores of the control group (M = -9.0, SE = 1.08, 
t(33)=1.40, p = .172). For face trials compared to body trials, LB’s difference score of 4.7% was 
not significantly different from the difference scores of the control group (M = 6.8, SE = .87, 
t(33)=.401, p = .691). 
 The analyses for Experiment 2 were then repeated with the age-and-gender-matched 
control in place of LB for the overall Experiment 2 performance test, for the tests of trial type 
(white-white, speckled-white, and speckled-speckled), as well as between both face and body 
trial types. Difference score tests were also conducted. 
The age-matched control’s overall performance on Experiment 2 was 78.1% correct 
across all 128 trials. This was not significantly different from the performance of the control 
group (M = 79.9%, SE = .68, t(33) = .438, p = .665). 
The age-matched control’s performance on the white-white trials was 66.7% and was not 
significantly different from the performance of the control group (M = 68.9%, SE = 1.10, 
t(33)=.351, p = .728). The age-matched control’s performance on speckled-white trials was 
100%, which was not significantly different than the performance of the control group (M = 
99.4%, SE = .31, t(33)=.343, p = .734). The age-matched control’s performance on the speckled-
speckled trials was 75%, which was not significantly different from the performance of the 
control group (M = 77.9%, SE = 1.01, t(33)=.484, p = .632). 
The age-matched controls performance on the face trials was 84.4%, which was not 
significantly different from the performance of the control group (M = 83.3%, SE = .87, 




not significantly different from the performance of the control group (M = 76.5%, SE = .74, 
t(33)=1.05, p = .300). 
For white-white trials compared to speckled-white trials, the age-matched control’s 
difference score of -33.3% was not significantly different from the difference scores of the 
control group (M = -30.4, SE = 1.10, t(33)=.446, p = .659). The age-matched control’s difference 
score of 25% between speckled-white and speckled-speckled trials was not significantly different 
from the control group’s difference scores (M = 21.5%, SE = 1.07, t(33)=.557, p = .581). For 
speckled-white trials compared to speckled-speckled trials, the age-matched control’s difference 
score of -8.3% was not significantly different from the difference scores of the control group (M 
= -9.0, SE = 1.08, t(33)=.096, p = .924). For face trials compared to body trials, the age-matched 
control’s difference score of 12.5% was not significantly different from the difference scores of 
the control group (M = 6.8, SE = .87, t(33)=1.11, p = .274) 
Discussion 
In Experiment 2, LB had an overall deficit in the identification of sheep, in contrast to the 
results of McNeil & Warrington (1993). However, LB did not have a deficit in identifying sheep 
during speckled-white comparisons, providing evidence that she can satisfice the identification 
task with her basic level recognition system. This result is consistent with the coordinate 
relations hypothesis. That is, if surface features can be used to differentiate two stimuli, then LB 
can do so.  
LB demonstrated that she had a deficit in identification of speckled-faced sheep 
compared to the control group. However, LB did not show a significant deficit for white-white 
comparisons, although numerically she responded correctly less often than the control group 




control group, have the smallest deficit on the speckled-white, followed by speckled-speckled, 
followed by her worst performance on the white-white trials which was predicted to be near 
chance level. However, LB had the worst performance on the speckled-speckled trials relative to 
the control group, which was not consistent with the a priori prediction. Why might this be? It is 
possible that floor effects prevented LB’s performance from being lower on both the white-white 
trials and speckled-speckled trials. She performed at 60.4% on both. Because there were only 
two response options (same/different identities), LB would have scored around 50% had she 
been guessing on all trials. An accuracy rate of 60% shows that she was guessing on around 80% 
of the trials with white-white or speckled-speckled comparisons. However, the control group 
performed much worse on the white-white trials (M = 68.9, SE = 1.1) than they did on the 
speckled-speckled trials (M = 77.9, SD = 1.01). As revealed by a post-hoc paired t-test, this 
difference is highly significant, t(33) = 8.26, p < .001. If LB was performing at floor (e.g., she 
was apparently guessing on 80% of white-white and speckled-white trials), then it is possible 
that the test used to determine if the mean of the control group differed from her performance 
was not sensitive enough to detect a significant difference in their abilities to identify white-
faced sheep. 
Additionally, LB had a deficit for identification of sheep both when face pictures were 
used and when whole body pictures were used. This pattern is evidence against the face 
specificity hypothesis. If the face specificity hypothesis were true, then LB should have been 
able to satisfice the body recognition task with her remaining object recognition system that is 
supposedly intact by focusing on the bodies of the sheep. However, her performance was 
impaired relative to the control group even when she had the bodies available for viewing. 




prosopagnosics have a deficit in recognizing, but rather stimuli that make use of a damaged 
coordinate recognition system. 
LB’s difference score between her performance on the speckled-white and speckled-
speckled trials was significantly higher than the control group’s difference scores. This pattern 
indicates that, relative to controls, LB was significantly impaired at differentiating speckled-
faced sheep from other speckled-faced sheep when compared to her ability to differentiate 
speckled-face sheep from white-faced sheep. This is evidence that when surface-level cues (e.g., 
spots vs. no spots as in McNeil & Warrington, 1993) are available to make judgements from, LB 
is better able to complete the task, but when the surface-level cues are not obviously available 
she is more likely to respond incorrectly. Therefore, the McNeil & Warrington (1993) findings 
concerning the prosopagnosic’s ability to differentiate sheep might have been confounded by the 
presence of surface cues. 
Because none of the t-tests comparing the age-matched control and the student control 
group were significant, age did not likely play a significant role in the significant differences 





CHAPTER 4.  GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The result that LB is impaired at identification of sheep directly contradicts McNeil and 
Warrington (1993) in which they concluded that prosopagnosia is a disorder specific to human 
faces. The present study, using superior methodology including the use of different viewpoints of 
the same individuals (encouraging match-to-identity and preventing the match-to-photo problem 
in McNeil & Warrington, 1993), has cast doubt on the received wisdom that prosopagnosics 
have no deficits recognizing sheep. In fact, LB was apparently guessing when she was asked to 
distinguish between two sheep without surface cues from which she could discriminate identity 
(i.e., her performance on white-white and speckled-speckled trials in Experiment 2). The face-
specificity hypothesis, inasmuch as it treats sheep faces as objects (e.g. Farah, 2004; Kanwisher 
& Yovel, 2006), cannot account for the finding that LB was impaired at identifying sheep 
because human faces were not involved in Experiment 2.  
 The biological relations hypothesis cannot explain these findings, because it has no 
reason to predict the differences in deficits at the trial level in Experiment 2. In other words, 
LB’s performance, according to the biological recognition hypothesis, should not have 
significantly differed at the level of sheep-related trial types. Because LB was shown to be more 
impaired at the identification of some sheep, but not all sheep, the biological recognition 
hypothesis cannot fully explain the findings. Additional experiments with LB confirm this, 
showing that some recognition tasks using biological stimuli with different structural 
descriptions (e.g., differentiating animals with different numbers of legs) are not impaired 
(Casner, 2006). 
The expertise hypothesis cannot account for these experimental findings because LB was 




system that is impaired in prosopagnosics relates to categories of objects with which that person 
has expertise—but LB, who was not a sheep expert, was impaired at sheep identification 
compared to controls. Therefore, because a deficit was found in a category for which expertise 
was not a factor, the expertise hypothesis cannot explain the results of Experiment 2. The 
coordinate relations hypothesis can account for the findings of the present experiments, as well 
as findings related to categories of stimuli frequently used in expertise experiments (e.g., animals 
such as dogs and birds) thanks to the demand for the computation of metric differences in expert 
differentiation tasks, such as those given to car or bird experts (Brooks & Cooper, 2006). 
The subordinate-level recognition hypothesis is not sufficient to explain these findings. 
Because differentiating a speckled-faced sheep from a white-faced sheep is a task at the 
subordinate level (i.e., they are both sheep, but with different identities), the hypothesis would 
predict that LB would be impaired at differentiating identities during speckled-white trials. 
However, LB performed no differently from controls on speckled-white trials, and relative to her 
own performance, she performed best on the speckled-white trials compared to white-white and 
speckled-speckled trials. The coordinate relations hypothesis would explain this finding in terms 
of the basic-level (i.e., categorical) system satisficing the task of identification based on the 
presence of spots or other highly salient visual features that are enough to categorize the sheep as 
different individuals. The subordinate- level recognition hypothesis is often in agreement with the 
predictions of the coordinate relations hypothesis, possibly because subordinate- level 
identification tasks often require the use of coordinate relations for correct differentiation. But 
when the two theories are in opposition, as in Experiment 2, the coordinate relations hypothesis 




The only extant hypothesis that can account for the current findings is the coordinate 
relations hypothesis. The coordinate relations hypothesis is further bolstered by the fact that 
prosopagnosics often (if not always) report deficits in recognition tasks with classes of stimuli 
other than human faces, although it is unfortunate that cases of acquired prosopagnosia in the 
literature often do not provide enough information about non-face recognition tests to determine 
whether the prosopagnosic has such deficits (see Busigny et al., 2010). Prosopagnosia as a 
“pure” disorder for human faces may not exist, although that is beyond the scope of this study. 
Prosopagnosics have been shown to have other, more subtle deficits to non-face recognition 
tasks (e.g., Behrmann & Plaut, 2012; Geskin & Behrmann, 2018). Because deficits to 
recognition tasks unrelated to faces are often more subtle and less disruptive to life than face 
recognition deficits, the face deficit may take center stage. However, one only need speak to 
prosopagnosics qualitatively in order to get the sense that their recognition problems do not stop 
there with the most obvious problem of faces (e.g., Bornstein et al., 1969; Casner, 2006; 
Damasio et al., 1982; Faust 1955). 
The limitations of this study, and any neuropsychological investigation of a single case, 
include the fact that visual deficits due to brain damage are extremely heterogeneous, and this is 
true of prosopagnosia as well (e.g., Barton, 2008; Esins et al., 2016). What may apply to one 
prosopagnosic may not apply to another. Additionally, there are logical difficulties with arguing 
that a deficit specific to face recognition does not exist. One could always argue that any person 
who presents with deficits in addition to face recognition simply have damage to other adjacent 
brain areas (e.g., Barton & Corrow, 2016; Davies-Thompson, Pancaroglu, & Barton, 2014).  
While the present study did not test the same prosopagnosic as used in the original 1993 




literature suggesting subtle deficits in non-face recognition tasks in prosopagnosics (e.g., 
Behrmann & Plaut, 2012; Geskin & Behrmann, 2018), casts serious shadows of doubt on the 
conclusion that their prosopagnosic had a face-specific deficit. McNeil and Warrington’s (1993) 
work has been cited well over 150 times in the literature at the time of this writing, and has been 
used to argue against the fact that prosopagnosics have difficulties with within-category 
identification of stimuli that are not human faces (e.g., Farah, 2004; Kanwisher & Yovel, 2006). 
Future theories of prosopagnosic processing deficits must account for deficits in the 
identification of stimuli that are not human faces per se, as this and other work continue to show 
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